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Literacy and the Languages_ of the Early Common Law 
PETER GOODRICH* 
Let us take up yet again this business of signs, for you have not understood, you have 
rem~ined rationalists, semioticians, Westerners.• 
The most famous of the libraries of antiquity was a collection of manuscripts 
brought together by the first of the Ptolemies in the third century B.C. in 
Alexandria. This "apogee of antique literary science" 2 brought together under 
one roof the Museion- some 500,000 manuscripts and an academy of scholars 
dedicated to systematic philological research. In the form of a_ cult organisa-
tion under a priest of the Muses, the Alexandrian library produced a number 
of early forms of educational grammar and an elaborate classification of 
earlier literature according to schemata of authorship and genre. Inter-
estingly, however, this ancient and exemplary monument to textual culture 
cannot be simply recorded as an instance of the growth of knowledge and of 
the ascendancy of the technologies of the written form. The Alexandrian 
Museion rapidly came to represent the dual aspect of writing as an institution 
both of progress and latterly of confinement. As the Alexandrian age 
proceeded, the Hellenistic culture which it hoarded and collated came 
increasingly to symbolise the accumulation and custody of relics - the 
establishment of a manuscript tradition alienated from living concerns and 
blighted by an elite literacy belonging to the e_xternal or 'other' world of 
writing. The massive accumulation of books led nowhere but to other books 
_ while the Ptolemaic linguistic consciousness symbolised nothing so much as 
the restriction oflanguage to a single code, the now familiar dystopia in which 
the Babel of discourse was reduced to one canonic universal language in which 
the life of the book was exhausted in the realm of philoiogy and bibliomania. It 
may well be that the history of the Museion is eventually to be remembered 
primarily for the idyll, the literary form in which book-weary Hellenistic 
scholars sang the praises <>f rustic life, of Sicily or Arcadia or the lesser islands 
where the p~verty of existence was tempered only by the absence of writing 
and the oral tradition was as yet unwounded by the double-edged technology 
ofliteracy.3 ' 
Warnings as to the evil of writing are, of course, as familiar and as 
antiquated as literacy itself. Plato in the Phaedrus recalled the Egyptian myth 
* Department of Law, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyrie, England. 
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ofTheuth in which writing was admonished-for "offering but the semblance of 
wisdom", and was stigmatised as no more than an 'external mark' which 
would instil forgetfulness in the soul, a "recipe not for memory, but for 
reminder".4 Ly'curgus of Sparta, according to Plutarch, issued edicts banning 
writing because it threatened education and the virtues of citizenship. 5 While 
the Spartans acknowledged writing as a strictly functional record of economic 
transactions, it was to be circumscribed by its wider context, one in which it 
did not disseminate so much as it destroyed the inner world of understanding 
in favour of mere obedience to law. Even within the supremely textual 
tradition of the Christian church the divine power of writing as scripture was 
constantly to be counterposed to the pentecostal 'gift of tongues' and the 
apostolic mission of taking the word to the people: 'the letter killeth, but the 
spirit giveth life'6 was through the ages the slogan of the sermo humilis and of 
the frequently heretical championing of the oral and vernacular against the 
established church and the Latin liturgy. To take a final example from the 
context ofliterary modernity, Foucault accorded Flaubert's The Temptation 
the dubious distinction of being "the first literary work to comprehend the 
greenish institutions where books are accumulated and the slow and 
incontrovertible vegetation oflearning quietly proliferates". Flaubert is to the 
library what Manet is to the museum: "they erect their art within the archive 
. .. every painting now belongs within the squared and massive surface of 
painting and all literary works are confined to the indefinite . murmur of 
writing''. 7 In sum, the paradoxical lament of the Alexandrian idyll, the 
nostalgic reinvocation of the pre-literate, the denial of the worth of literacy 
and of the dusty aura of manuscript and parchment, the sense of bookish 
confinement to the exclusion of a living discourse and a spoken truth are quite 
as common as the legalistic praise of writing as permanent mark and as self-
assured and authentic record. "More fertile than the sleep of reason, the book 
perhaps engenders an infinite brood of monsters. Far from being a protection, 
it has liberated an obscure swarm of creatures and created a suspicious 
shadow through the mingling of images a_nd knowledge. " 8 
Scholars, of course, have a peculiar interest in reinstating the 'genuine' 
power of writing as rational discourse and in invoking a relation to the public 
sphere which would preserve the existing technology and forms of custody of 
· administrative and legal know.ledge. Where intellectuals decry the threat of 
illiteracy or bemoan the irrelevance of a particular form ofliterate knowledge 
and library learning there is always the possibility that the crisis is internal to 
the academy and that what is most immediately threatened is the status and 
survival of a particular clerical elite which lives, as much as anything else, upon 
the status of the book and the humanism it incorporates. 9 There is a lengthy 
tradition, however, as well as a possible irony to contemporary concerns with 
the new technologies and the new media of communication and of record. Any 
form ofliteracy carries with it the dangerous double mark already observed in 
the advent of writing. It threatens the earlier tradition and custody of 
knowledge and information, it fractures the pre-existent unities of grammar 
and of semiosis as interpretation, it undermines the contemporary forms of 
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reason and of rational discourse. · In the moment of its birth the new 
technology ofliteracy unleashes not simply the possibility of more permanent 
or more efficient networks of information but equally the issues of access and 
control, the questions with which the doctrinal discourse of the disciplines is 
always at some level engaged. Who will determine which channels, data, and 
signs are forbidden? Who will know? Who will speak? What form will the new 
dialogue and rhetoric take, how will its masks be evaluated, and to what use 
will it be put?10 
The questions which have consistently surrounded the development of new 
forms ofliteracy and new systems of signs are not to be understood as internal 
to the structure of signification nor as being reducible to issues of the accuracy 
and repetition of things represented. They are, rather, substantive and 
material aspects of the distribution of knowledge and the formation of 
archives.and it is this material aspect of literacy which I will examine in the 
present essay in terms of the development and use of writing within the early 
years of the common law tradition. Varied in its languages and frequently 
distrustful in its recourse to writing, the common law tradition is something of 
a limiting instance in the history of legal texts. Prone as it has been to 
recollecting a myth of a spoken and accessible customary law and to berating 
the incursion of foreign scripts and alien written law, the mixed character of 
English law11 is fertile ground, both in doctrine and practice, for the analysis 
of conflicting literacies and competing groups of literati. Writing is never 
innocent nor singular: 
... struggles for powers set various writings up against one another. Let us not shrug our 
shoulders too hastily, pretending to believe that war could thus be confined within the field 
of literati, in the library or the bookshop . . . the political question of literati, of 
intellectuals in the ideological apparatus, of the places and stockages of writing, ofcaste-
phenomena, of 'priests' and the hoarding of codes, of archival matters - all this should 
concern us. 11 
The writings of the common law tradition, in contrast to the civilian doctrine 
of ratio scripta, at least have the benefit of never having been uniformly 
presented as an unequivocal unity. Their history and reception was con-
sistently one of conflict between different institutions of confinement and of 
opposed schools of interpreters. The languages of record were from the 
beginning politically charged while the production, storage, and utility oflegal 
documentation was the object of continuing dispute. There is, indeed, little 
evidence of legal writing being received as an unmitigated cultural good or as 
self-evidently rational, and it is in such a context that it seems more 
immediately appropriate to raise the questions not only of who wrote, but also 
of where such writings were located, by whom were they protected, and to 
what public·sphere did they speak. 
FORMS OF LITERACY 
The transition from orality to literacy has been praised and denigrated as a 
homogeneous phenomenon more often than the term literacy has been 
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adequately defined. The tendency of contemporary studies is to overstate the 
uniform advance which literacy represents and to greatly overstress the unique 
features of the semitic phonetic alphabet as the facilitator of new forms of 
consciousness, of reason, and of science. 13 The alphabet becomes something 
of a key to a civilised mentality and the 'thunder-clap' of literacy brings on the 
storm of knowledge. A particular cultural form and use of literacy is thus 
reconstructed with all the enthusiasm that an Enlightenment concept of 
reason can bring to bear, to represent the phenomenon and function of 
literacy as such. It is precisely the tenuous and partial development ofliteracy 
in the early Middle Ages which can best disabuse a pre-eminently rationalist 
and ideologically saturated tale of unimpeded progress. 
On reflection, it should indeed be obvious to the inhabitants of an era 
characterised by increasingly fragmented specialist knowledges and 
competing literate competencies, of new forms of literacy that are also often 
labelled illiteracy, that literacy is diverse in both its forms and social functions. 
For lawyers in particular, who, as will be examined later, lay claim to expertise 
in the translation of a language perculiarly of their own making, it should be 
obvious that the notion of literacy is polyvalent and clearly one of degree. 
Literacy connotes competence in or access to specific institutions and 
technologies, specific languages, and specific social roles. The competencies in 
question are too complex to be covered by a uniform concept of the ability to 
read and write, however such skills are defined. From the eleventh century to 
the fifteenth century- for my purposes the formative years of the common law 
tradition - reading and writing were distinctive skills and those who could in 
some measure read butnumbered by far those with access to the materials and 
implements of writing. For the period in question it was indeed reading and 
dictating that were coupled in the ars dictaminis (the art of composition/ 
dictation) rather than reading and writing, the latter being the function of the 
priestly scribe (scriptor). 14 
The precise meaning of literacy was also a much disputed issue during the 
medieval epoch itself. 1 5 In the disputations of the inaptly named Dark Ages, 
differing forms ofliteracy struggled for dominance and, from St. Augustine to 
the scholastics, the term itself could refer to anything from profession of the 
Christian faith to knowledge of law, or from familiarity with Donatus's ars 
minor and maior - the rules of Latin grammar - to a knowledge of the classical 
· authors and an ability to read and compose Latin verse. In a confusing array 
of usages, we thus find a leading Christian rhetorician of the sixth century, 
Pope Gregory the Great, denying the value oflinguistic decorum and claiming 
to despise "the proper constructions and cases because I think it very unfitting 
that the words of the celestial oracle should be restricted by the rules of 
Donatus" .16 Somewhat later the roles were reversed and the twelfth-century 
chronicler of St. Augustine's abbey at Canterbury referred to Hubert Walter, 
the chief justiciar and chancellor of England as well as founder of the royal 
archive, as laicus et illiteratus (as an illiterate member of the laity) and also as 
juris ignarus (a legal ignoramus). 17 Somewhere in between the humanistic 
John of Salisbury, a contemporary and associate of Vacarius, observed 
stringently that: 
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We find men, who profess all the arts, liberal and mechanical, but are ignorant of this very 
first one [grammar] without which it is futile to attempt to go on to the others. While other 
studies may also contribute to letters (litteratura) , grammar alone has the unique privilege 
of niaking one lettered (litieralum). 11 
While admitting that the very distinction between literati and illiterati is 
frequently a misleading one in medievid usage, some semblance of substance 
to the distinction can be elicited by simple reference to the mode of production 
of writing, to the institutions, economy, and social role of script. First, I 
consider the restricted economy of writing. The new technology was based 
upon the Greek and Roman alphabetic script and during the Middle Ages 
used parchment and vellum rather than the classical papyrus as the form of 
written record. In that its techniques were difficult to learn and expensive to 
utilise both in terms of materials and in terms of skilled and arduous labour 
time, it was initially a highly restrictive and somewhat obscure enterprise. The 
physical act of writing was one in which "the whole body labours" 19 and the 
scriptorium, which required expensive skills and materials, was sparingly used 
by the larger monasteries (where the scriptorium would generally be closed 
during the winter months) and later by clerics in the employ of the royal court 
and chancelleries. 20 In terms of economic preliminaries, writing was the 
product of a very small elite of clerics who worked both in their own cause 
(that of transmitting the sacred writings) and also increasingly for a growing 
class of worldly patrons (the monarchy and aristocracy). In economic terms, 
medieval society of the eleventh century was literate in the sense that culturally 
essential knowledge was transmitted in writing - the Bible and its exegesis, 
statutory laws, charters, writs, and chronicles- bu~ such literacy should not be 
equated with the ability to read and write. Literacy here means a combination 
of two circumstances: 
(I) the need for access to the written tradition for the exercise of one's social function, and 
(2) the use of available means of such access, be it one's own ability to read and write, or 
[more normally] another's. 21 
In institutional terms the sole heir to the schools and administrative literacy 
of the Roman empire was the monastery. The antique Church of the martyrs 
was succeeded by that of the monasteries, and from 500 A.O. onward the 
Benedictine orders took over in its entirety the task of transmission not simply 
of the truths of the faith and the history of the Church, but also of profane and 
sacred, legal and secular, learning. The monasteries became "the chief support 
- and from the eighth century onwards the only support - of writing and 
the book".22 While it is certainly true that the Church inherited a rhetorical 
tradition and a doctrine of the spoken word - a populist doctrine which 
stressed the oral art of preaching - it also came early to recognise the elite 
organisational power of writing and of the Latinate literacy upon which such 
power rested. With far-reaching consequences for European civilisation the 
Church monopolised the costly means and skills ofliteracy. By virtue of being 
the only institution capable of providing formal education, the Church 
regulated the number of scribes and restricted the manufacture and 
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circulation of manuscripts according to its needs. The Church came to achieve 
an effective control over all social institutions, even monarchies, simply by 
taking priestly ~barge of the most powerful of the available means of 
transmitting the indispensable knowledge necessary for centralised organ-
isation. That it was the Church that mobilised European society for the 
crusades simply reflected the fact that it was the literate Church alone among 
the European institutions that possessed the organisational and comm_unica-
tive capacity to take on such an enterprise.23 
For several centuries writing was no moi:e nor less than the discourse of the 
Church, and within that discourse were subsumed not only the subordinate 
administrative and legal documentations qf the nascent bureaucracies but also 
the very concept of literacy itself. By the twelfth century the opposition 
between clericus ard laicus (betwen the 'chosen' priestly elite and the 'crowd' 
or 'people') was synonymous with the opposition between literatus and 
illiteratus. Ecclesiastics and scholastics were by definition lettered. while the 
laity- amongst whom the upper and commercial classes had generally, by the 
thirteenth century, some rudimentary reading skills - were by definition 
unlettered or illiterate. 24 It remains to be noted that in its institutional context 
literacy connoted a specific Latinate form of literacy which the scholastics 
increasingly reduced to a set of technical rules, to authoritarian formal 
grammars of correct usage. In this form, Latin represented a dominant 
literacy, a learned language and alien writing adopted from the south for 
intrinsically political reasons whose dreary and legalistic authority was to be 
challenged consistently though in the main ineffectively by both oral and 
vernacular traditions. In terms of the social role of literacy, it may be 
concluded that the elite and exclusory status of Latin together with the 
consolidated administrative power of writing formed more of an obstacle to 
the development of social channels of communication than it acted as their 
facilitator. The phrase the 'Latin Middle Ages' constitutes a challenge rather 
than a statement.25 
ARCHIVE AND LIBRARY 
The definition of the technology of writing as being, like any other technology, 
governed by principles of economic and institutional role can serve as a useful 
starting-point for an examination of the emergence, storage, and uses of early 
records and books within the administrative and legal spheres of the Anglo-
Norman state. The Latinate ecclesiastical context of this nascent textual 
tradition does not enable it to escape the conflict between oral and literate 
modes, nor does it immediately exclude the ambivalence and distrust of 
writing that accompanies all emergent literate traditions. The engrafted 
character of the manuscript tradition, the foreign form, and the alien language 
utilised by the priestly scribes, would have been sufficient on their own to 
ensure resistance at all levels of the social hierarchy. As it was, the tradition 
had also to face the additional burden of being itself internally divided both 
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doctrinally and historically. The Church had inherited from the collapse of the 
Roman Empire a literacy that was geared to administrative and legal needs, a 
writing-system concerned with the profane requirements of organising and 
subjugating the imperial territories. Within this pre-eminently mundane form 
the Church had to accommodate the sacerdotal and symbolic needs of the 
living faith. For much of their early history the clerical records of both Church 
and State- the documentation of faith and law alike- represented the product 
of conflicting tendencies in which oral narrative forms and the metaphorical 
and magical properties of writing frequently overrode the claims of authentic 
record. The manuscript literature was as much the product ofimagination and 
of the figurative aspirations of those seeking revelation as it was the literal 
representation of legal entitlements. 26 
The most basic unit oflanguage, the sign, is denved etymologically from· the 
Latin signum and refers to the pictorial marks used as standards by units of the 
Roman army. In an analogous fashion, the iconographic form of the sign is 
replicated in the metaphoric status of the written word and the symbolic 
character of the book (textus). The earliest literature known to the common 
law tradition is to be understood as metaphysical rather than practical, sacred 
and not profane in its import. For the Christian King Alfred it was "divine 
purpose, and not fate that rules" and his Laws were as much cosmological as 
substantively legal. They started with the Ten Commandments and moved to 
a restatement of the laws of Moses together with a summary of the Acts of the 
Apostles. Nor is there any substantial evidence of the Laws ever having had 
any practical significance. 2 7 Even more strikingly, one of the first reported 
political decisions of William the Conqueror was that of emulating the 
emperors of antiquity and invoking the imperial dominium of civilian 
jurisprudence by bringing the conquered people under the rule of written law. 
With the continental jurisprudence came also the ecclesiastical Latin ofthejus 
scriptum and the symbolism of the book. The most immediate and exemplary 
product of this imported literacy was no less a work than the Domesday Book, 
the very title of the work invoking Revelation, the book of judgment, of 
scripture, and of law - the last word both majestic and unalterable, magical 
and immune to the blandishments of time. What is important is that the Book 
is pre-eminently a symbol: its form was that of a liturgical text which 
irrevocably associated writing with royal power and its purpose was that of 
invoking the Justinian and Carolingian empire and imperium, the new start 
represented by the form of a code rather than a substantive body of decisions 
and rules. 28 The availa.ble evidence indicates that Domesday Book was 
perceived as a public representation of power, a symbol of sovereignty, and 
not as a practical document. It was neither referred to in the plea rolls nor used 
in administration for the two centuries subsequent to , its official 
promulgation. 
The binding of legal writing to public statements of political power and 
feudal prbperty right can also be evidenced by examination of the internal 
~tructure of the early forms of documentation. In a predominantly oral 
culture, writing was only one of many systems of record and title and it 
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necessarily drew at least some of its terminology and methods from the 
competing rhetorical processes. While legal and administrative documenta-
tion grew during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, their most important 
forms - the charters, chirographs, writs, memoranda, chronicles, and 
cartularies-were exceptions rather than norms of registration and record. It is 
not simply that they were elite and restricted forms of public statement but 
also that they were cross-cut by earlier traditions of symbolisation and 
reporting. For obvious reasons they were neither the subject of any rigorous 
procedures of auth~ntication or accuracy nor were they the object of any 
systematic concept of the exhaustive or originary quality of written proof. As 
late as the thirteenth century, a legal record (recordationem) was still a form of 
oral witness, a deed (factum) was a physical act and not a conveyance, while 
that fond obscurantism of property lawyers, seisin, meant physical possession 
and no more technical legal form of title. 29 
In a period when a book (textus) simply meant an interweaving of disparate 
elements - a compilation of diverse manuscripts or fragments brought 
together within the sacred covers of the book - it takes little imagination to 
perceive that writing would for long remain as much a mystical as a mundane 
exercise. Writing has a reciprocal relationship to rhetorical culture: the 
monastic histories and registers were quite literally fictions, panegyric 
narratives which incidentally related founding donations of land only when 
written testimony - black paint on sheep skin (wethers) - became an 
occasional aid in warding off royal encroachment on monastic title. 30 
Similarly the writs, charters, plea rolls, and Year Books were haphazard 
collections of legal materials. The former were frequently forged as necessity 
occasioned, while the latter were subject to no systematic tabulation or 
indexing, nor were they records so much as compendia of pleas and 
arguments, the documentation of rhetorical exercises and seldom of 
judgment.31 Where writing was used as proof it had its adjuncts and 
complements in symbolic objects: swords, daggers, and other treasured relics 
as well as in the pervasive rhetorical art of memoria. Access to the magical 
- properties oflegal title and remedy was not in general a literary exercise. When 
in 1301 King Edward endeavoured to prove title to the kingdom of Scotland 
his arguments were based upon narrative and myth and not at first upon any 
written proof of jurisdiction. Only when the iconic and oral signs had failed in 
their task did Edward resort to the archive, to the "chronicles and registers" 
which in their turn proved.insufficiently persuasive.32 Even more graphically, 
the quo warranto (by what warrant) proceedings of King Edward's reign had 
to be abandoned because written title to land was too exceptional and too 
untrustworthy to form the basis of legal claims. 33 
The context of writing was rhetoric, a discipline which was well described by 
C. S. Lewis as the "greatest barrier between us and our ancestors". 34 Oral 
skills, memory, and testimony, as well as the various iconographic and 
unwritten signs or figurations formed the central elements of legal procedure 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As is well known, the antecedents of the 
legal profession were oral pleaders, narrators (conteurs) who literally told a 
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tale and argued a cause, frequently relying for their interpretation of the law 
upon the rhetorically skilled knights, the buzones judiciorum referred to by 
Bracton.35 Where documentation was referred to, the manuscripts were 
ornate and embellished, their text was interwoven with visual signs of 
classification, with systems of symbols and interlinear glosses. And their 
library was the treasure chest, the sanctuary, or the chapel. They were •holy 
mysteries', tenacious letters that far from publicising their contents were, 
according to Fitzneal's Dialogus, stored in sacred hiding places - sacramen-
torum /atibula. The term archive (archiva) itself refers to a hiding place, and 
both the book and its repositories were sacred and not secular. Statutory laws 
and charters as well as chronicles and registers were dedicated and addressed 
not to their readers but to God and to eternity. The book itself was a 
deposito.ry for disparate manuscripts and its covers were a protection ·and 
sacralisation of its contents-the book would be placed upon the altar before 
being stored in a sacred place under the guardianship of heaven for the benefit 
of posterity rather than for the immediate purposes of administration. The 
document was almost immediately a relic surrounded by stone and anathemas 
and even legal records were scattered between different religious houses before 
coming to be kept in the chapter house of Westminster abbey. There is 
eviclence that they were later moved to the New Temple in London and later 
still in the fourteenth century to the White Chapel in the Tower.36 
LANGUAGES OF THE LAW 
The powers attributed to the alphabet, to the "signs that bring the speech of 
one absent to our ears without voice'? 7 as well as to the books and to the 
mysteries of the scriptorium, find ample expression in the languages of 
medieval culture. Preceding and co-existent with the legal uses of writing there 
is a metaphorics of writing, of Hermes and the Muses, which the Christ.an 
tradition supplements with books which decide the fate of the soul in eternity 
(Revelations 20. 120, with "heavens [which] shall be rolled together as a scroll" 
(Isiah 34.4) and with tables of law "written with tfle finger of God" (Exodus 
31 .18). For medieval jurisprudence God was the source of all law and tacitly if 
not explicitly the author of all books. Ultimately the laws of the kingdom were 
derived from God's commandments, and for John of Salisbury in the 
Policraticus the lineage of positive law was expressly one which moved from 
the imago dei to the rex to lex animata. 38 It should thus occasion little surprise 
that the language of the law came initially from the Church. 
I . Law Latin 
While William the Conqueror i.s accorded the role of having introducedjuri 
scripto /egibusque into the oral and vernacular tradition of properly English 
raw, the Latinate literacy is in fact much older. Coke's Reports provide 
uncertain evidence of the •tearnedly archaic' language of Celtic laws, "they 
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used to do it in the Greek tongue, so that the discipline might not be made 
common among the vulgar", 39 but the first substantial evidence of the 
languages of legal literacy dates from the later years of the Roman occupation 
when the Christian Church made its·first steps into Britain, and by the late 
seventh century England was officially Christian. With the Church, of course, 
came renewed ties with the continent, a knowledge of writing, a reintroduction 
of Latin, and a vocabulary that was to remain a significant part of the later 
Iaw.40 
Latin received a major further impetus from the Norman invasion and 
rapidly became the dominant written language of English law, of the early 
statutes, charters, and writs. Although William separated Church courts from 
secular courts, the influence of the Church was pervasive in both. In keeping 
with the history of medieval Latinate literacy in general, it was the Church that 
both trained and regulated scribal classes used in the chancellery and the royal 
courts, while it was also from the ecclesiastical class that the first chancellors, 
royal judges, and legal drafters were drawn. The royal law that became the 
early and curiously-named 'common' law was devised not by the express will 
of the people (voluntas popuU) but by clerics employed by the crown and 
trained in canon and Roman law. 41 Owing more to the Latin tradition and the 
feudal role of the aristocracy than to vernacular traditions, the rapid\y 
formalised writing of the early common law soon sedimented in ritual 
patterns, in verbose Latin statutes, Latin plea rolls, writs, and formularies. 
Although recent scholarship now dates the first English law school at Oxford 
from the 1190s and doubts that the glossatorially trained Vacarius played any 
greater role in its formation than that of providing the first textbook (the Liber 
Pauperum), there is no doubting that for the purposes of administrative and 
legal writing it was the civilian tradition imported from Bologna, Montpellier, 
and Paris that formed the essential model of legal study.42 
Those aristocrats and aspirant clerics who wished to study law could only 
do so by attending the continental schools at great expense and by learning the 
methods and techniques of Justinian's law. If the first major treatise on 
English law, attributed to Glanvill though perhaps written by Hubert Walter, 
constituted a "revolution in legal science",43 it did so by systematically and 
expressly applying a civilian methodology and language to the writs and other 
forms of the common law in the hope of proving that the English law, though 
unwritten, was as valid as the lex scripta.44 The Latinate influence ofVacarius 
and of Glanvill lay at · the heart of the early language and structure of the 
common law, and the social and linguistic significance of this early influence 
can usefully be examined in two forms: first and briefly, in terms of the general 
political role of Latin; and second, in terms of the distinctive features of the 
peculiarly English form of law Latin. 
The Latin inherited from Rome by the nascent medieval European states 
was not classical Latin but rather the predominantly textual language of the 
empire. It was only with the growth of the empire that the rhetorical Latin 
developed during the later Republic became subject both to th_e centripetal 
pressures of the imperial bureaucracy and to the equally unifying rules of 
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standard grammars and norms of correct written usage. Following close on 
the heels of the legions came the grammarians who would translate the 
military subjection of the imperial territories into the requirements of a 
dominant discourse: the regularity and obedience demanded by fixed texts 
and invariant rules of spelling and syntax.45 In a famous anecdote from 
Suetonius, the emperor Augustus, who. was himself reported to be eccentric in 
his spelling and grammatical usage, ordered the removal of a consular 
governor for being rudis et indoctus (backward and ignorant) simply because 
he had written ixi for ijJsi.46 Grammar and strict codes of correct usage 
worked both to instil a particular ideology but also ensured the Alexandrian 
decline of the written language once formalised usage became historically 
divorced from vernacular practice.47 Latin became a learned language in both 
senses of the word, a language of administration and of power at the pinn.acle 
of the social hierarchy of discourses. It was pre-eminently a social language, a 
language conferring status which Bakhtin has dubbed a 'unitary' language 
representing the "victory of one reigning language (dialect) over others", a 
usage which serves to direct attention "away from language plurality to a 
simple proto-language", a Ptolemaic or absolutist linguistic consciousness 
"from whose point of view other languages are perceived as in no way its 
equal".48 
Turning to the particularity of the common law tradition, it remains for me 
to specify the development of a unitary written discourse within the Anglo-
Norman realm up to the mid-thirteenth century when law French in some 
measure replaced law Latin.49 Law Latin, while it certainly adopted the 
unitary characteristics of the general Latinate culture and equally made use of 
the mystical symbolics of writing and the clerical culture of the book, 
developed certain idiosyncracies and usages of its own. lndebitatus assuinpsit 
(being indebted he undertook), for example, would in classical Latin mean 
that he was not in debt, the prefix in meaning not. Other usages were coined 
from Latin; fieri facias (cause to be made), habeas corpus (have the body), 
mandamus (we command), subpoena (under a penalty) being early and legally 
obvious examples. 50 However, the development of a Latin that was specialist 
even to the general Latin culture served only to re-emphasise the restricted 
guild character of early legal writing. Coke in James Osborne's Case51 referred 
to "words significant, and known to the sages of the law, but not allowed by 
grammarians". Coke's 'false and incongruous Latin' was explained by 
Blackstone as being in reality "a mere technical language, calculated 
[nonetheless] for eternal <;luration, and easy to be apprehended both in present 
and future times; and on those accounts best suited to preserve those 
memorials which are intended for perpetual rules of action". 52 
The unitary role of law Latin was not, however, only a question of the 
grammatical structure or internal cohesion of the legal usages so much as it 
was a party to the general ideological thrust of the writing system to which it 
belonged. Latin literacy was always to a greater or lesser degree a minority 
skill which protected itself behind a hostile condescension towards the oral 
and the vernacular. Where Pliny the Younger referred to the ragged and filthy 
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crowd (sordidi pullatique53 ), Walter of Chatillon - a curricula author of the 
twelfth century - was less restrained in describing the unlettered as animae 
brutae. 54 Latin alone had the 'dignity of eloquence' in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries and the clerical justice Walter Map expressed a common 
view in dismissing the 'vulgar' tongues (English and French alike) as being fit 
only for the "trifling of mummers in vulgar rhymes". Slightly later the Oxford 
scholar Father Roger Bacon was cosmological in his scope; stating that: 
. .. from the beginning of the world the common people (vulgus) were separated from the 
knowledge (sensus) of the saints, the philosophers, and all other wise people, and all wise 
men despised the ways of the common people." 
For the twelfth-century abbot Philip of Havengt, literacy of itself raised an 
individual well above other people, and even Dante referred to moderni bruti, 
although in a somewhat different context. 56 
2. Law French 
Written Latin remained the sole language oflegal record for the two centuries 
following the Norman Conquest. It was the exclusive language of statutes up 
until the mid-thirteenth century and even in the late thirteenth century it still 
predominated. Latin was the language of the plea rolls, of the register of writs 
(Registrum Brevium), and of the court records up until the seventeenth 
century. When written pleadings were introduced in the early fourteenth 
century they were in Latin and also remained so until the seventeenth century. 
More interestingly and importantly, the Latin influence lived on in the new 
vernacular literacies, both in elements of their vocabulary and, more 
impor'tantly, in their formulation of grammatical rules. 
Latin was both an obstacle and an aid in the development of alternative 
literacies. The vernacular languages were initially disparaged throughout 
Europe, and the administrative centres and languages remained resolutely 
Latinate in emulation of the western Roman empire to which they saw 
themselves as successors. Denied access to the status ofliteracy, the unwritten 
vernaculars developed haphazardly as oral dialects varying from region to 
region and from context to context. The local character and unstandardised 
· usages of these linguistic communities did not, however, prevent their being 
identified with the political aspirations of their community. That Latin lived 
on so long as the written language of the Anglo-Norman administration can 
plausibly be interpreted as a result of the political competition between:middle 
English and French as alternative literary languages. For some considerable 
time, the stigmatisation of the vernacular assigned French and English to the 
peripheral role of languages of entertainment and of the written romances 
(histories) - works performed for the amusement of very small and elite 
aristocratic groups. 57 
When French came to compete with La tin as the language of administration 
in the thirteenth century, it was Latin that unsurprisingly formed its model of 
systematisation and it was, somewhat more paradoxically, from the centres of 
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the learned language that the impetus came. It was the scholastics who first 
applied th¢ Latinate rules of correct usage and grammar to the vernacular 
languages and worked to systematise their styles according to classical 
techniques. The vernaculars required 'Latin tutelage' and this they received 
only when sufficient political will and cultural authority had been invested in 
them. The political backing of French was the product of the middle years of 
the thirteenth century, the period which in all probability witnessed the first 
Year Books as well as the first French language statutes, charters, textbooks, 
wills, and other memoranda. It is of the law French of the Year Books that the 
incomparable stylist Maitland baldly and surprisingly stated "that precise 
ideas are here expressed in precise terms, everyone of which is French: the 
geometer or the chemist could hardly wish for terms that are more exact or less 
liable to have their edges worn away by the vulgar". 58 English lawyers; for 
Maitland, had enjoyed the "inestimable advantage" of being able to forge 
their very own technical language, a language impervious to foreign influence 
by virtue of its very technicality. 
Maitland's views may well have given expression to the aspirations of the 
early systematisers oflaw French, though it is more likely that the justificatory 
rhetoric enclosing the new written language hid the economic and political 
utility of the language to an as yet uncertain profession and its need for 
mysteries around which to form an exclusive and expensive medieval cult. 
What is much less arguable in the face of the reports themselves is the pious 
belief that the new language was either precise or unchanging. At one level 
Maitland simply gave expression to a long-standing legal doctrinal dogma, 
one which was equally well elaborated in the earlier institutional writings of 
Coke and Blackstone. 59 In the Commentar)' on Littleton the argument put 
forward in favour of law French was precisely analogous. Law French was 
learned French and not a spoken dialect, it could not be either "pure or well 
pronounced" and similarly one would find in it "a whole army of words, 
which cannot defend themselves in be/lo grammaticali, in the grammatical war, 
and yet are most significant, compendious, and effectual to express the true 
sense of the matter". 60 The ancient terms drawn from legal French were to be 
considered a vocabula artis assigning precise meanings to intricate legal 
concepts. 
It may be noted first that to its contemporaries the new verbal alchemy was 
somewhat less than attractive and that as early as the mid-fourteenth century 
the Statute of Pleadings 1364 gave written form to the voluble outcry of the 
majority of English-speaking communities. Ironically, the Statute of Plead-
ings was drafted in French and the relevant clause, a sentence 384 words in 
length, allowed that the court records were to remain in Latin. The central 
issue was addressed in clause 15(2) where it stated that: 
. . . reasonably the said laws and customs the rather shall be perceived and known, and 
better understood in the tongue used.in the said realm, and by so much every man of the 
said realm may the better keep, save, and defend his heritage and possessions . .. . 61 
On the other hand, subsections (5) and (6) allowed that "ancient terms and 
forms" were to be "holden and kept as they be and have been before this 
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time". In short, the Statute of Pleadings was significant as a documentary 
record of the degree of resistance to the administrative use of law French. but 
as substantive law it was equivocal, inconsistent, and ineffective. Later 
attempts to legislate in favour of the vernacular and against the "unknown 
tongue" of the lawyer, the nomenclature which Bentham vividly depicted as 
"devised in a barbarous age, by a mixture of stupidity, ignorance, error and 
lawyer-craft", were equally ineffective and short-lived. 62 fo 1650 An Act for 
turning the Books of the Law, and all Process and Proceedings in the Court of 
Justice, into English lasted only so long as the Commonwealth and was 
repealed with the Restoration of 1660, while new legislation in 1731 had little 
substantive effect upon the literate practices of either the courts or the legal 
profession. 63 
The context of law French as a written language was that of Latin, a 
tradition of the fixed text in which the standardisation of meanings within a 
sclerotic learned language had to be counterposed to the mysterious symbolics 
and custody of iconic and sacral manuscripts. Divorced from the classical 
rhetorical tradition with its emphasis on practice as opposed to the schematic 
logic of medieval dialectic, Latin literacy had become a doctrine of canonic 
meanings and of rituals of sanctity and obedience. While law French never 
achieved either the internationalism or the coherence of its Latin model, it 
certainly made use of the vitriolic ideology of the unitary language. In practice 
law French was characterised by a mixing of archaic terms with coined usages. 
It was polyglot in its recourse both to Latin and to middle English legal terms 
and its style reflected all the pomposity and prolixity of a register which 
happily used synonyms drawn from three eras and communities of language 
where one could have served much better.64 Its grammar and specialism were 
less the result of technical precision than the outcorne of specific institutional 
factors. The changing nature of property ownership required the rapid 
proliferation of terminologies. The severity of the law encouraged fervent 
particularism in a system which boasted near on a hundred capital felonies at 
the end of the seventeenth century inclusive of being an 'Egyptian' or a 
Catholic priest, or for 'conjuring wicked spirits'.65 The profession itself was 
poorly trained, little regulated, and, most indicatively of all, its scribes were 
paid on the basis of the length of the documents they produced.66 The 
atmosphere of the profession was one of dialectical and verbal sophistry. Its 
intellectual pretensions were played out in the specious "wittes oflogitians"67 
and its rhetorical aspirations - "a shadow of the ancient rhetoricke"68 led 
little further than the aristocratic parlour-game disputations of the (nns of 
Court. 69 Even the legalistic witch-burning Mathew Hale, appointed r t)rd 
Chief Justice in 1671, spoke of the written law "as the rolling ofa snowhall, it 
increaseth in bulk in every age, till it become utterly unmanageable . every 
age did retain somewhat of what was past, and added somewhat of its own . . . 
And this produceth mistakes .... It must necessarily cause ignoran1.e in the 
professors and profession itself."70 
To the multilingual character of the law books must finally be added the 
explicitly exclusory stance of legal d·octrine toward all other ling11i-.;11c 
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cominuriities and usages. Just as Latin had preserved its unitary status as a 
discourse by scorning the vernacular, law French would brook no challenges 
from non-legal dialects. Armed with little more than an amorphous history of 
lexical invention and a ready willingness for linguistic pastiche, the old 
arguments of the classicists were rolled out for the benefit of the new and more 
diverse literary form. For the Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon the closure of 
legal discourse was necessitated by "these modern languages [which will], at 
one time or other, play the bankrupt with the books". 71 Coke was more direct 
and simply observed that: 
.. . it was not thought fit nor convenient, to publish either [the Reports] or the statutes 
enacted in those days in the common tongue, lest the unlearned by bare reading without 
right understanding might suck out errors, and trusting to their conceit, might endamage 
theipselves, and sometimes fall into destruction. 72 · • 
While the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw increasing protest at the 
arcane usages oflaw French, even the reforming statutes dared not remove the 
offending vocabularies, a·nd apologists such as Roger North in the eighteenth 
century continued to argue the curious view that "the law is scarce expre~sible 
properly in English". To attempt an English rendition of the law was 
'uncouth', the work was that of the wrangler and not that of the authentic 
lawyer in the genuine language of the law. 73 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE OF LAW 
The indications already given as to the material character of the technology of 
writing, its forms of custody, and its variable languages all suggest that the 
public spheres oflegal writing were limited and elitist. More interestingly and 
controversially, the sacral and iconic aspects of the development of the literate 
culture also suggest that its public sphere was more complex and many-tiered 
than the doctrinal supposition of a unitary language has generally allowed. 
Both within and without the profession, the development and ianguages of 
'the books' of the law formed a dialogic history accompanied by numerous 
polemics, by competing discourses, and by the conflict between different 
institutional and social conceptions of the status and role of the written sign. 
In the early epochs of common law discourse the ecclesiastics, both canonist 
and civilian, the monarchy, the loose groupings of narrators, notaries, and 
treatise writers, as well as the judiciary themselves all sought to some degree to 
influence both the discourse and the language of the nascent legal order. The 
notion of the sign as simple representation of a 'thing' signified, as a 
graphematie substitute for the spoken message, or as the code allowing 
retrieval of an externally existent 'information' foretold the distant spectres of 
a future and desolate philology ending contemporarily in linguistics and the 
positivist variants of semiotics. 74 Before it became representational, the 
written sign bore with it a more complex array of awe and of play, of an 
hegesis but also a hedonism of discursive signification more i;:losely allied to 
allegory and mask than to scholastic certainties or the grammarian's truth. 75 
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The very notion of a public sphere is republican and not theocratic. It 
properly belongs to the short-lived classical epochs of ancient rhetoric and is 
by definition resistant to the discursive closures of.the scholastic dialectic and 
its imperially-derived literate forms. While there is no direct parallel between 
the classical institutions and audiences and the medieval reception of the 
ancient texts, a brief analysis of the concept itself necessitates its placement in 
its earlier discursive home. While the concept of a public sphere, of the agora 
and other assemblies, was intrinsic to the development of the epic and forensic 
oratory of Homeric and classical Greece, the tradition in question was 
primarily an oral one. Certainly Greece was literate and the Athenian laws had 
been codified as early as the sixth century B.C., but the pre-eminently oral 
tradition of argumentation that accompanied those laws rendered them 
largely irrelevant to the substantive pr;;tctices of the public sphere: 
An Athenian could not even imagine relying on official registration procedures, written 
documents and the interpretation by legal experts of an unambiguous body of written 
rules to define his status and secure his rights. ' 6 
The relevant model of a literate public sphere is rather to be located in the 
late classical and early imperial eras of the Roman Republic. Within the 
protean concept of res publica are to be found not simply the oral disputations 
of the senate as law-makers or the erudite casuistry of the elite juristic schools, 
but also the public declaration and promulgation of written law, the 
development of plebiscites and somewhat later the growth of the bibliopo/a 
(book publishers) and the accompanying creation of specific public spaces for 
the dissemination of literary works, the tric/inia and auditoria of the great 
houses as well as the public buildings dating from the reign of Hadrian. 71 As 
well as the public reading oflaws and other literary works, the evidence of the 
literature itself demonstrates the broad constitution and scope of the 
specifically literate public sphere. It was neither exclusively Roman nor simply 
patrician. Rather, it was the product of the empire, of the spread of elementary 
schooling in grammar and rhetoric. Having but one of its centres, though a 
significant one, in the legal sphere of the jury trial and forensic address, the 
literate public grew with the administrative bureaucracy of Rome's military 
possessions. It was entirely in keeping with the cosmopolitan character of this 
. educated public that Pliny related how Tacitus at the Roman games told his 
neighbour, in all probability a nobleman from Gaul, that "You know me from 
my writings", to which the knight reponded "Are you Tacitus or Pliny'!"18 
The most relevant feature of the classical public sphere was its essential 
linkage to political decision-making. Forming the opposite extreme of the 
Alexandrian philology, the life of the literary community as in any way an 
active institution was everywhere tied to its involvement in the formation of 
both social and military policy. Without suggesting that this in any sense 
formed the kind of ideal discqurse situation invoked by contemporary 
humanists, 79 it may still usefully be asserted that the community to which 
Cicero, Atticus, Tacitus or Pliny belonged was marked by a genuinely 
Hellenistic form of political dialogue and persona, "the great game of public 
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life, the struggle for power, in which the personality unfolds before the eyes of 
all" and human life was staked immoderately upon the political fate of the 
community.80 Tacitus in the Dia/ogus provided the most eloquent testimony 
to the death of an institution and not simply an art. The public sphere had been 
built around forms of political and legal practice; the courts, the hustings, the 
plebiscites, and the senate house provided the occasions of a broad practice 
which needed both power and community to sustain it, "for the true basis of 
eloquence is not theoretical knowledge only, but in a far greater degree natural 
capacity and practical exercise". 81 In the era of the empire, Tacitus perceived 
the growing degeneracy of schools which had no extant link with practice, no 
topics nor audience82 by which to fuel the 'flame of eloquence'. Most tellingly, 
he attributed the decline to the changing form of government: "What is the use 
of one h~uangue after another on public platforms, when it is not the ignorant 
multitude that decides the political issue, but a monarch who is the incarnation 
ofwisdom?"83 With the contraction of the political institutions and processes, 
satire, theatre, literature, and poetry also waned. Pliny referred to a situation 
"quite different from that of Cicero, to whose example you refer me .... I have 
no need to tell you what narrow limits are imposed on me."84 Those limits 
long outlived the fall of the western Roman empire and when it comes to 
delineating the public sphere of Anglo-Norman legal processes, their 
definition can only be attempted in the largely negative terms inherited from 
the declining years of a moribund tradition. In so far as many of the relevant 
considerations have already been outlined, I shall provide a schematic 
elaboration around three key issues: those of the forms of written address, 
their institutional audiences, and finally, the role of written communication in 
the formation of legal discourse. · 
The many-tiered significance of the written sign - its simple representation, 
evocations, and invocations- may be traced initially to the theocratic mode of 
its internal address. It is not only that the early codes and writings were 
religious in their origin and sacral in their content and custody, but they were 
also explicitly addressed and presented to the divine auditor (public). The 
written law did not invoke a secular enforcement, but rather invoked and 
addressed God as both cause and support. Legal offers were offerings to God, 
title was the inscription on the cross, and for King Athelstan, in a charter of 
934, those who ignored the disposition granted "shall be the companions of 
Judas, the betrayer of Christ, enduring punishment for all time in the torment 
of hell". In another tenth-century deed, the explicit support of delivery and 
possession invoked by the written law was not the 'external mark' of the 
document itself but rather the incorporeal threat of excommunication from 
the living Christ in which infractors "shall be cut off and hurled into the abyss 
of hell for ever and without end".85 This hieroglyphic writing .enfolded the 
secular in the invisible scripture of the 'other world'. It brought with it the need 
for the authorities (auctoritates) and custodianship of the priesthood. Even 
Magna Carta in 1215 conferred 'by the grace of God' a concession from the 
sovereign, the human representative of the divine will: "we have granted to 
God, and by this our present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs for 
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ever that the English church shall be free and shall have her rights and liberties, 
whole and inviolable". 86 The validity of the document was not 
representational so much as it was a medium of divine inscription and a 
symbol, an allegory of the hidden word. It spoke 'the language of the sacred 
and not merely the profane, its protection was the wrath of heaven and it was 
to be treasured not as an administrative utility but as a benefit or concession, a 
magical relic belonging in a loose sense to the early museu·m, the sepulchral 
home in which the right of might was mysteriously transformed, in the face of 
history, into legal title. 
The institutional bearers of the early manuscripts needed the political 
hacking of church and monarch to preserve their hostage properties precisely 
because the Anglo-Saxon tradition was resistant to the new technology of 
writing and its foreign exponents and languages. The early writing was used 
not to record - in our barren contemporary sense of a correspondence between 
_signifier and signified - but rather to establish in a negative and monologic 
fashion a public statement of sovereign power. It thus seems plausible to 
interpret the narrative vagaries of the early documentation and the curious 
ambivalence of their usage both as evidence of the absence of an indigenous 
public sphere and also as a record of resistance to the claims of conflicting 
language communities. While there was a marked growth in the use of 
documents for purposes of economic transaction and property title in the 
thirteenth century, the use of writing for procedures of registration and 
identification did not escape the ambivalent mark of the iconic and symbolic 
politics of writing. 
Outside of the Church and the monastic schools, there was no public sphere 
or literate audience that might participate in a more general culture of writing 
or literate dialogue, but simply an oral and vernacular tradition which was 
largely hostile to the imposition of a Latinate tradition of manuscripts. 
Writing was by its nature and language learned, and its only audience must 
have shared its concerns and topics which were correspondingly liturgical and 
administrative. 87 What evidence is available suggests that the first literate elite 
in twelfth-century England consisted almost exclusively of the high Anglo-
Norman nobility; that it was dependent upon clerics under the patronage of 
the aristocracy; and that it nowhere approached the formation of a public 
sphere that could be termed a reading audience. 88 What scholarly community 
there was came to England from the continent, the first university schools did 
not emerge until the end of the twelfth century, and what participation there 
was in intellectual life was rare, the scholars living in schools dispersed across 
Europe and only irregularly communicating with one another. 89 The non-
scholarly community was even more restricted and concerned with narrative 
history, legend, and myth best exemplified in Geoffrey of Monmouth's 
Historia regum Britanniae (I 130), a successful and fabulist account of early 
English historical legends which was sufficiently imaginative to offend neither 
of the dominant national groups. 
The administrative use of writing must necessarily have had a quality not of 
dialogue but of statements which were· neither readily intelligible nor even 
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accessible. The economy of the manuscript traditi~n restricted the circulation 
of documents to the monasteries and the administration, there were no other 
secular libraries or archives outside of a very few and small collections in the 
treasure chests of the nobility. Where documents did appear in the public 
domain it is, therefore, unsurprising that they appeared as foreign and 
instrusive to their subjects and were prone rather to impress or mystify than to 
inform. The ill-fated Thomas More writing in the early sixteenth century was 
forced in his Utopia to the view that lawyers were "a sort of people whose 
profession it is to disguise matters" and moderately observed that it was an 
"unreasonable thing to oblige men to obey a body oflaws that are both of such 
bulk, and so dark as not to be read and understood by every one of the 
subjects".90 Even earlier, the judiciary of the twelfth and thirteenth cent~ries 
had no great faith in written records. Constantly forged, they lacked any ready 
means of authentification in a culture of juries and oral testimony, the quo 
warranto proceedings collapsed because written evidence was too haphazard 
and recent to be acceptable as proof, while when in 1279 Roger of Seaton 
retired from the Bench, he stated that his plea rolls, now deposited in the New 
Temple, could not be vouched for "because one thing is done and something 
else - more or less - is written in the rolls by the clerks, who are always failing 
to understand the litigants and disputants correctly".91 The monumental 
quality of documentation inscribed and preserved the records more for 
posterity than for any existent audience or practice. 
There is, finally, the danger of writing both as a literal threat, a technology 
which purports by alien means to prove alternative titles to feudal status and 
property, but also a history of usages more fecund and varied than any simple 
utilitarian concept will allow. To the Romans of the pre-classical era, litteratus 
meant to be branded with a letter of the alphabet, to be marked as a slave. 
Writing was a means of power and that power later took novel forms in the 
code and in written law. The history of those different modes of writing system 
registered both power and resistance to the 'imaginings' summoned by 
manuscript and book. The unitary character oflegal discourse derived from a 
culturally specific form of written power, a Latinate literacy and grammar 
which was neither incontestable in its form nor singular in its practices. 
Writing may well record but it may also be concluded that its history is 
redolent of other promises and dangers. There is the danger specifically of a 
form of literacy which controls and censors by a logic of exclusion - a literacy 
of closure which acts not so much as a reminder but as a means of forgetting. It 
is salutary to recall that writing may also function in the institution as a form 
of delirium .in which lawyers write so as not to speak, in which they intone 
· ritual formulae so as to avoid thinking and, in sum, exhaust their \(nowledge of 
writing in the subtle and subdued casuistry of an unwarranted bibliomania 
locked in the sanctuary of the latter-day archive. 
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